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that  I have being doing  this,  I have  found  that  integrating mental disability  law  themes 
into  the course materials and class discussions makes criminal  law a much  richer class.  
Including mental disability  law  issues achieves four  important goals. The  first goal  is  to 
make  explicit  the  tensions  that  inhere  in  a  modern  criminal  justice  system,  which,  in 
seeking to hold people accountable for their actions assumes that behavior is “chosen,” at 
the same  time  that an expanding body of scientific evidence demonstrates  that much,  if 
not all, human behavior, is shaped profoundly by environmental and genetic factors.  The 
normative question of when a biological/psychological/environmental “explanation”  for 
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with,  the  language of neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology,  so  that  they can better 
understand and evaluate  judicial opinions and other public pronouncements.   The  third 
goal is to help students understand the significant connections between mental disability 
issues  and  gender  discrimination.    Last,  and  not  always  least,  I  teach  about  mental 
disability  in  the  criminal  law  course  in  order  to  recruit  students  for  my  upper  level 
seminar on mental disability law.     
 
Mental  disability1  issues  can  be  discussed  on  a multitude  of  occasions  in  the 
course on criminal  law.   My own  idiosyncratic approach emphasizes mental disability’s 
intersections with the doctrinal aspects of criminal law.2 These intersections fall into five 
categories:   1)  the  justifications  for punishment;   2)  the definition of crime  in general,  to 
wit,  the  requirements  of  a  voluntary  act, mens  rea,  and  causation;  3)  the  definition  of 
particular  crimes,  such  as  murder,  manslaughter,  rape,  and  burglary;    4)  defenses  to 
crime, including mistake of law and of fact, as well as justification (including self‐defense) 
and excuse (including insanity and duress); and 5) considerations in sentencing, including 
                                                                                                                                                                             
including Debby Denno, Josh Dressler, Jill Gross, Tim Hall, John LaFond, Michael Perlin, Audrey Rogers, 
Bob Schopp, and Chris Slobogin.   
1 In this article, I will generally use the term “mental disability” to include both mental illness,  which 
encompasses the increasingly broad range of  mental disorders recognized by the American Psychiatric 
Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (see DSM IV-R (  ), and mental retardation.  In 
particular sections of this article, I will focus more specifically on mental illness or mental retardation. 
2 Another interesting approach, taken by Villanova Law Professor Richard Redding, focuses on exposing 
students to the practical, procedural aspects of having a criminal client with a mental disability. Richard E. 
Redding, Why It is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How 
To Do It), 14 Wash U. J. Law & Pol. 407 (2004). 
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punishment:  retribution,  deterrence,  incapacitation,  and  rehabilitation.    This  is  a  good 
time  to ask  students  to consider  the  relevance of mental disability  in deciding how  the 
purposes  of punishment may be  achieved, both  in general  and  in particular  cases. For 
example, a discussion of  retribution  should  include materials which permit  students  to 
understand that mental illness or mental retardation can render persons less culpable for 
their behavior, even as their conduct prompts outrage or horror.  In discussing deterrence, 
students  should be  asked  to  consider whether  a defendant’s mental disability makes  it 
more  or  less  likely  that  he  can  be  specifically  deterred  from  future  criminality  and 
whether others will be deterred if he is punished.4  Although the rehabilitative model has 
largely been  rejected by  this country’s  legislatures,  students can be exposed  to  the  idea 
that  rehabilitation,  including  mental  health  treatment,  may  render  some  people  less 
dangerous  and  therefore  less  in  need  of  incapacitation  through  physical  confinement.  
Discussions of punishment also provide an excellent opportunity  to  expose  students  to 
                                                          
3 These include Joshua Dressler, Richard J. Bonnie, Markus Dubler, Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2001), 
Kaplan and Weisberg, and Perkins and Boyce. 
4 This is also an appropriate occasion for discussing whether a defendant’s substance abuse should affect 
his culpability. See also discussion of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Powell v. Texas, 
392 U.S. 514 (1968), infra in text accompanying n’s [ 10-11]. 
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rudimentary concepts of mental disability,  for example,  the differences between mental 
illness  (including  psychosis,  neurosis,  mood  disorders,  and  personality  disorders)  and 





Discussing  the  general  requirements  of  criminal  culpability  also  provides  the 
occasion for discussing mental disability.  When we address the essential requirements of 
a voluntary act, mens  rea, and  causation, mental disability  figures prominently.    In  the 
classic case of People v Newton,5 Huey Newton’s conviction for manslaughter was reversed 
for failure to instruct the jury that unconsciousness is a complete defense under California 
law.6    In  the Kadish and Schulhofer casebook,  the Newton  case  is  followed by notes on 
other “involuntary act” cases,  including  the epileptic driver  in People v. Decina,7 and  the 
sleepwalking Mrs. Cogdon, discussed by Norval Morris.8 These cases can and should be 
updated  by  Professor  Deborah  Denno’s  recent  article  on  Crime  and  Consciousness.9 
                                                          
5 People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). In reversing the conviction, the California 
Supreme Court noted that the jury had been instructed on diminished capacity as a mitigating factor, and 
observed that “[t]he difference between the two states – of diminished capacity and unconsciousness – is 
one of degree only,” as the former provides a “’partial defense’” by negating the relevant mens rea, while 
the latter “negates capacity to commit any crime at all.” Id. at 405-06.  Thus, the Newton case also provides 
the opportunity to discuss the continuum of mental states and mental state defenses.   
6 At the time, Cal. Pen. Code § 26 provided that, “All persons are capable of committing crimes except 
those belonging to the following classes: … Five--Persons who committed the act charged without being 
conscious thereof.” This rule continues today in a renumbered Section Four. 
7 238 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956). 
8 Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5 Res Judicatae 29   
(1951).  
9 Deborah Denno, Crime and Consciousness, Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 269 (2002). 
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Denno  argues  that  the  classic  dichotomy  between  conscious  and  unconscious,  and 
voluntary  and  involuntary  acts  needs  to  be  revised  in  light  of  modern  neuroscience 








either  volitional,  and  therefore  blameworthy,  or  involuntary,  and  therefore  non‐
criminal.  While drawing these fuzzy lines may be inconvenient at this early point in the 
semester, when we seek  to help students develop some clear organizing principles  for 
criminal  law,  addressing  these  cases  now  has  the  advantage  of  putting  students  on 
notice  that  there are  few black and white principles  in  the criminal  law.   Furthermore, 
introducing  students  to  the  expert  testimony  of  neuroscientists,  psychiatrists,  and 
psychologists will make them more attuned to the significant role such experts play  in 




                                                          
10 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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in motion by  the defendant,  and when  it does not.   Comparing  the  cases of People  v. 
Campbell13 and Stephenson v. State14 can be very useful.   In Campbell,  the defendant was 
angry with a man who had sex with his wife, and encouraged him to kill himself, going 
so  far  as  to  provide  him  with  the  weapon.  The  victim  obliged,  and  Campbell  was 
charged  with  murder.  On  appeal,  the  Michigan  Court  of  Appeals  quashed  the 
prosecution, because  the court  found  that  the victim’s  independent actions had caused 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
   12 This issue is raised, inter alia, in the insanity defense and self-defense contexts, but it is not too early in      
the course to consider efforts to reign in the role of experts, such as Congress’s enactment of the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act in response to John Hinckley’s acquittal on grounds of insanity.  In this Act, Congress 
amended the federal insanity defense to declare that:  
…It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the 
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental 
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. 
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.   
18 U.S.C. §17 (a).   
At the same time, Congress amended Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide that:  
Opinion on Ultimate Issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a 
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the 
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. 
Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.  
As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. West, 962 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 
1992), Congressional action in the Insanity Defense Reform Act reflects its “skepticism not about the 
spectacle of competing mental health experts and their conflicting testimony but about their competence to 
testify about moral questions of criminal responsibility.” Id. at 1248. 
13 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. App. 1983). 
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his death.  In contrast, in Stephenson the defendant, who was the head of the Indiana Ku 





as  law  teachers we  should  be  concerned with  the  extreme  stretch  the  court made  in 
order  to  justify  affirmance  of  the  conviction,  as  it  was  necessary  to  find  the  victim 
absolutely mentally irresponsible in order to conclude that her act of taking poison did 
not  sever  the  causal  chain  set  in motion  by  the defendant.   The  Stephenson  case  thus 
offers a good opportunity for students to comment on the Court’s gendered response to 
alleged incapacity and vulnerability.  Stephen Miles and Allison August have discussed 
the  gendered  nature  of  judicial  analysis  of  incompetent  individuals’  previously 
expressed  preferences  about  foregoing  life‐sustaining medical  treatment,  finding  that 
courts  tend  to  ignore or disparage  statements made by competent women about  their 
wish  to  die  if  particular  circumstances  arise,  frequently  dismissing  the  women’s 




                                                                                                                                                                             
14179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932). 








Much  of  criminal  law,  and  particularly  the  law  of  homicide,  focuses  on 
identifying the mens rea required to commit a specific crime, and the policy implications 
of  that  choice.    One  area  in  which  mental  disability  issues  are  easily  taught  is  in 
comparing  the  common  law  defense  of  provocation/heat  of  passion17  with  the  more 
modern  Model  Penal  Code  defense  of  extreme  emotional  disturbance.18    This  defense 
permits mental  illness  and  other  psychological  abnormalities  not  rising  to  the  level  of 
insanity to mitigate murder to manslaughter, when the traditional heat of passion defense 
would not.   At  the  same  time,  as  the Casassa19  case  indicates,  even  the more  generous 
extreme  emotional disturbance defense provided under  the Model Penal Code  and  the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Stephen Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and “The Right to Die," 18 Law Med. & Health Care 
85, 88 (1990).  
17 For a classic statement of this doctrine, see, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 
(Mich. 1862). 
18 Model Penal Code § 210.3 provides that a criminal homicide “which would otherwise be murder” is 
mitigated to manslaughter when “(b) … [it] is committed under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.  The reasonableness of such 
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be.” 
19 People v. Casassa, 404 N.E. 2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).  
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are  illustrated  by  the  poorly  educated Native American  parents  in  the Williams21  case, 
who were  convicted  of manslaughter  based  on  child neglect,  the  adolescent defendant 
aggrieved by being sodomized and then laughed at in Camplin,22 and the squishy notions 
of the reasonable person in self‐defense, be it battered women or the “reasonable racist” 23 
in  the  Goetz24  case.    By  explicitly  discussing  mentally  disabled  defendants  and  the 





                                                          
20 N. Y. Penal Code § 125.25 tracks the language of the Model Penal Code closely.  In pertinent part, it 
provides that: 
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third 
person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that: 
      (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there 
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the 
viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant 
believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a 
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime…. 
 
21 State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).  
22 D.P.P. v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (2 All E.R. 168).   
23 See  Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Beyesians, and Involuntary 
Negrophobes, 46 Stanford L. Rev. 781 (1994), cited in Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, 




issues.    First,  the  question  of  how  mental  disability  can  affect  consent  should  be 
examined from the perspective of both a mentally disabled defendant25 and a mentally 
disabled  victim.26    The  limits  on  aggressive  cross‐examination  of  the  prosecutrix, 
including  the  desirability  and  constitutionality  of  rape  shield  laws  and  the  extent  to 
which  the victim’s mental health may be explored by defense counsel, have  long been 
controversial.27  There is ongoing debate about whether motions to compel the release of 
the  victim’s  psychotherapy  records  or  even  to  compel  her  to  submit  to  a  psychiatric 
evaluation  prior  to  trial  are  a  necessary  aspect  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  right  to 
confrontation28  or,  instead,  serve  as  examples  of  the  gender  bias  of  an  inequitable 
criminal  justice system, which places the victim on trial and forces her to suffer further 
humiliation  and  mental  anguish.29    An  open  exploration  of  the  connection  between 
gender  bias  and  our  socially  constructed  notions  of  mental  illness  will  bear  fruit 
throughout the criminal law course. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E. 2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
25  
26 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW 872-73 (4th ed. 2003). 
27 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW 882-83 (4th ed. 2003). 
28 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding in the case of a father charged, inter alia, 
with rape and incest, that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and compulsory process 
were not violated by a failure to disclose his daughter’s statements to a state child protective agency), 
Commonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding that a defendant charged with rape and 
sexual assault was not entitled to see the victim’s post-crime psychological counseling records), 
Commonwealth v. Sciuto, 623 F.2d 869 (3rd Cir. 1980) (upholding the trial court’s refusal to order a 
psychiatric examination of the prosecutrix as within the court’s discretion). 
29 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW 882-83 (4th ed. 2003), Susan Estrich, Palm Beach 





Mental disability  issues  often  arise  in  the  context  of  a  “cultural defense”  case, 
when a defendant claims that her actions, while not legal in the United States, would be 
lawful under the law of her home country or culture.   In the Kimura30 case, a Japanese‐




initially  to  assert  a  defense  of  mistake  of  law  or  a  cultural  defense,  but  the  district 
attorney  found  this  unacceptable.    Instead,  the  defendant  entered  a  plea  bargain  in 






Defendants’ mental disabilities are often  relevant  in determining whether  they 
have  a mistake  of  fact defense.   As noted  above,  in  rape  cases,  a defendant’s mental 
                                                          
30 People v. Kimura, cited by Michelle Oberman, Criminal Law: Understanding Infanticide in Context: 
Mothers Who Kill, 1870-1930 and Today, 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 707 (2002). 
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disability  can bear on  the question of whether he mistakenly believed  the victim was 
consenting to intercourse.32  In the context of burglary, a defendant’s mental illness has 
also  been  deemed  relevant  to whether  he was  acting  under  a mistake  of  fact which 
precluded his possessing  the mental  state necessary  to  commit burglary.    In People  v. 
Wetmore,33  the  defendant  had  long  history  of  hospitalization  for  mental  illness.    On 
release  from a Veterans Administration hospital, he entered an unlocked,  temporarily 
unoccupied  apartment  and  made  himself  at  home,  wearing  the  owner’s  clothes  and 
cooking his  food, under  the delusion  that  this was his own apartment.   The  trial court 





teaching  the  elements  of  burglary,  as  well  as  exposing  students  to  the  breadth  and 
complexity  of  mental  disabilities  that  exist,  and  the  fact  that  they  range  along  a 




                                                                                                                                                                             
31 Id. at 733, n. 112, citing Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1293, 1293-
94 (1986). 
32  
33 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1978). 
34 Under California Penal Code § 459, “Every person who enters any house, room, apartment … with intent 
to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. …”     
 13
   
Many criminal  law professors shy away  from  teaching  insanity, often claiming 
the press of  time.   However,  I suspect  that  this choice often  reflects a professor’s own 
lack of comfort with the subject matter.   In contrast, since I  love the  insanity defense, I 
always  teach  it.    I  have  found  that  focusing  on  the  details  of  the  ALI‐Model  Penal 
Code,36  M’Naghten,37  and  Durham38  tests  is  less  successful  than  using  one  case  to 
illustrate many of the strengths and weaknesses of the insanity defense.  In recent years, 
I  have  used  with  considerable  success  the  case  of  Charles  Heads,  presented  in  the 
Reisner, Slobogin, and Rai book, Law and the Mental Health System: Civil and Criminal 
Aspects.39  The Heads  case  involved  a  Vietnam  vet  experiencing  post‐traumatic‐stress 
disorder who killed his brother‐in‐law, ostensibly while he experienced a “flashback” in 
which he believed that he was in Vietnam, under attack.40 This case permits students to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269, 583 P.2d at 1312. 
36 The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code § 4.01 provides: 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result  
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality  
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
(2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.  
37 The rule in M’Naghten’s Case was announced after an outpouring of public opinion against a jury’s 
finding that Daniel M’Naghten was not guilty by reason of insanity for murdering Edmund Drummond, the 
secretary to Prime Minister Robert Peel, whom M’Naghten mistook for Peel.  Responding to a 
parliamentary inquiry, the English judges told the House of Lords that: 
 
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time  
of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,  
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, 
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 
 
10 Cl. & F 200, 8 Eng. Rep 718 (1843). 
38 The Durham test, which governed in the D.C. Circuit from 1954 to 1972, provided that “an accused is 
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect.” Durham v. 
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
39 Ralph Reisner, Christopher Slobogin, and Arti Rai, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS (4th ed. 2004).  
40 Id. at 540-45. 
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understand  the  various  doctrinal  approaches  to  the  insanity  defense,  particularly  the 
difference between the cognitive and volitional prongs of the insanity standard.  It also 






have  been  struck  by  how  resistant  students  are  to  the  idea  of  the  insanity  defense, 
illustrating what Michael Perlin  calls  “sanism.”43 Teaching  the  insanity defense using 




In  addition,  it  is possible  to develop  research  and writing problems using  the 
insanity defense.   At Pace Law School, where criminal  law  is taught as a two‐semester 
course combining legal research and writing with substantive criminal law, I was able to 
give  students more  in‐depth  exposure  to  the  insanity defense  by devising  a problem 
which  raised  the  issue of whether  the  insanity defense should be available  in  juvenile 
                                                          
41 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV-TR  (     ).  
42 Yates v. State, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 81 (Tex. Ct. App. June 6, 2005) (reversing the murder conviction 
of a mother of five children who drowned them, believing because of psychotic delusions that they would 
be better off dead than “perish[ing] in the fires of hell”). 
43 Michael Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 Clinical L. 
Rev. 683 (2003).  
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court.44   Using this problem permitted me to educate students about the juvenile court 





Duress  provides  an  excuse  to  crime when  the  criminal  act was  performed  in 
response  to  an  imminent  threat  of  serious  bodily  harm  or  death  to  the  defendant  or 
another, under circumstances  in “which a person of reasonable  firmness…would have 
been  unable  to  resist.”45   The  note  cases  in Kadish &  Schulhofer46  are  very  useful  in 
pushing students to confront the outer  limits of duress, and permits a consideration of 
difficult  issues related  to mental disability.   The cases ask whether mental retardation, 
multiple  personality  disorder,  and  battered  women’s  syndrome  are  relevant,  and 
therefore admissible, on the question of duress.  Discussion of these cases helps students 
explore  the  fundamental  purposes  of  providing  an  excuse  for  duress  and  also  helps 
them confront latent gender bias in the law.  
 
                                                          
44 State courts are divided on this issue.  See, e.g., In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178, 184 (holding that due 
process requires that an insanity defense be permitted in juvenile delinquency proceedings) and People v. 
Golden, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803-04 (Ark. 2000) (holding that neither due process nor equal protection 
principles require states to provide an insanity defense for juveniles, even if such a defense is authorized for 
adult criminal defendants).   
45 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.09 (1). 
46 Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra n. [2], 
at 851-52. These notes raise the question of how much the reasonable person should be subjectivized, and 
include Zelenak v. Commonwealth, 475 S.E.2d 853 (Va. App. 1996); Regina v. Bowen, [1996] Crim L. 
Rev. 577, 578; United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 1994); and United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. 







Discussion  of  battered  women’s  syndrome  and  other  mental  illnesses  clarify 




and confront again  the difficulty of subjectivizing  the  reasonable person, whether  it  is 
the  reasonable  battered  woman,  the  reasonable  racist,48  or  the  reasonable  battered 
child.49  At the same time, Robert Schopp, Barbara Sturgis, Megan Sullivan,50 and Susan 
Estrich51 have made clear the problems of developing a defense predicated on a gender‐




                                                                                                                                                                             
 
47 United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973), State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1961). 
48 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986), Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable 
Racists, Intelligent Beyesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, supra n. [20]. 
49 Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo.1984). 
50 Robert Schopp, Barbara Sturgis, Megan Sullivan, Battered Women’s Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and 










the death penalty  context, when we  consider whether  a defendant’s mental disability 
constitutes a mitigating circumstance and also when we examine cases in which mental 
disability is cited as an aggravating factor.   In both types of cases, students are forced to 
confront  their  own  stereotypes  about  the  extent  to  which  mentally  ill  or  mentally 




                                                                                                                                                                             
51 Susan Estrich, Defending Women (Book Review, Cynthia Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered 
Women, Self-Defense, and the Law (1989), 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1430, 1434-37 (1990), excerpted in Kadish & 
Schulhofer, supra n. [2], at 772-73. 
52 See generally the discussion in Reisner, Slobogin, and Rai, supra n. [34], at 463-68 and 470-74, 
summarizing the literature. 
53 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical disparities in the rates at 
which the death penalty was imposed in Georgia on white and black defendants convicted of murder and of 
those murderers convicted of killing black v. white victims was not in itself grounds for invalidating the 
death sentence imposed in this case, absent a showing that the jury acted on the basis of race here), cf. 
James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL 
CASES, 1973-1995 (2000); Craig Haney, Condemning The Other In Death Penalty Trials: Biographical 
Racism, Structural Mitigation, And The Empathic Divide, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1557 (2004); Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is a grossly disproportionate sentence for the 




whether  future dangerousness  should be  considered  in  imposing  the death penalty,55 
and  also  whether  the  likelihood  of  the  defendant’s  future  dangerousness  has  been 
established by reliable evidence  in a particular case.56   Through an examination of  the 
justices’  sharp disagreements about  the  reliability of psychiatric predictions generally, 
and  in particular,  the  testimony of  the  infamous Dr. Grigson, students are able  to gain 
valuable  insights  into  the  role  of  expert  witnesses,  particularly  psychiatrists  and 
psychologists.    
 
Similarly,  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in Atkins  v.  Virginia57  prohibiting  the 
execution of the mentally retarded has opened a new era in death penalty jurisprudence, 
in which  entire  classes  of  persons  are  excluded  from death  penalty  eligibility due  to 
shared class characteristics.  58   Discussing the unfinished business of Atkins, the factors 
and processes that are likely to be used by the lower courts in deciding whether or not a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the Post-Furman Era, 49 S. M. U. L. Rev. 1507, 1510 (1986) (finding significant gender differences in 
the imposition of the death penalty) and Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender 
Discrimination, 25 Law & Society Rev. 367, 368 (1990) (arguing that “[t]he chivalry from which women 
supposedly benefit [in being sentenced less often to death when circumstances might otherwise warrant] is 
too costly: In ideological coin it is supposed to be repaid with tacit recognition of the moral inferiority of 
females and our lack of aptitude for full citizenship.”). 
54 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
55 See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976). 
56 463 U.S. at        . 
57 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
58 Roper v. Simmons, 125 Sup. Ct. 1183 (2005) (holding that juveniles who were less than 18 at the time 
they committed the crime charged cannot be executed). Of course, another significant aspect of both 
decisions was the extent to which the majority opinions relied on law from other jurisdictions to support its 
conclusions about the content of “evolving standards of decency” under the Eight Amendment.  See e.g., 
Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count? Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive 
Authority, 45 Va. J. Int’l L.        (2005). 
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Finally,  discussion  of  specialized  sex  offender  legislation  permits  students  to 
confront again the purposes of punishment and the elusive nature of the “mad vs. bad” 
distinction.    Sex  offender  statutes,  and  the  indefinite  “civil”  commitment which  they 
authorize,60 highlight the limitations of the free will model of human behavior on which 
the  Anglo‐American  criminal  law  relies.    Here  again,  the  gap  between  what 
neuroscience and psychological research tells us and the responses of state  legislatures 
and  judiciaries  to  sex  offenders  is  wide  indeed.    In  discussing  the  involuntary 
commitment  of  sex  offenders,  students  are  called  upon  to  confront  the  arbitrary  and 
unclear line between confining people for purposes of punishment and confining them 
in order that they be “treated” and incapacitated for public protection, in order to round 
                                                          
59 See, e.g., Bill Lockyer and Taylor S. Carey, Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded:  
Implementing Atkins, 15 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev 329, 334-40 (2004). 
  
60 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act, 
which permitted the indefinite confinement for “treatment” for those who had served a term of 
imprisonment who were found to suffer from “a mental abnormality or personality disorder  which makes 
the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence” against a substantive due process 
challenge), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (holding that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator 
Act was constitutional because it required the state to show that the alleged sexual predator had a 
substantial volitional impairment). 
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  The  criminal  law  course  can  be  greatly  enhanced  by  using  cases  involving 
mentally disabled offenders to illustrate a wide variety of doctrinal principles.  Exposing 
students to the complexities of mental  illness and mental retardation makes the course 
more nuanced and more “real,” and provides a useful  lens  through which  to examine 
the policy  choices underlying penal  legislation and decisions  in  individual  cases.   Far 
from  being  an  “add‐on”  or  an  additional  burden,  discussing mental  disability  issues 
throughout the criminal law course permits students to emerge from the course with a 
deeper understanding of the fundamental conundrums of the criminal law.    
 
